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When Theresa was 11 years old, the San Diego 
Department of Social Services removed her from her mother’s 
home for neglect.1 Throughout the next several years, foster 
home placement changes compelled her to change school 
districts four times. Consequently, Theresa quickly fell behind 
in her classes. At age 15, Theresa was arrested for shoplifting 
a sweater and spent several months in juvenile hall. Upon her 
return to foster care, she became discouraged and dropped out 
of high school. With the support of a caring foster care 
caseworker, Theresa passed the General Educational 
Development High School Equivalency Exam (GED) at the 
age of 17. For most youth, turning 18 marks a developmental 
milestone; for Theresa, it meant being evicted from her foster 
home. Like many 18-year-olds with no place to live, Theresa 
slept on friends’ couches when she left foster care. Her 
                                                 
* 2002-2004 Equal Justice Works fellow at the Legal Aid Society of San 
Diego, Inc., and the coordinator of the Youth Outreach Project; J.D., New 
York University School of Law, Root-Tilden-Kern Scholar, 2001. The 
author is grateful to Colby Berry and Adriana Cordoba for their research 
assistance, and Prof. Anthony Thompson, Prof. Colin Crawford, and Clare 
Maudsley for their considerate feedback on early drafts. In addition, the 
author thanks the Equal Justice Works Fellowship Program for generous 
financial support. This article is dedicated to the memory of the author’s 
father, Dr. Robert D. Benedetto, who dedicated his life to the pursuit of 
social justice.   
1 Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 2004). Names 
are changed to protect client identity. 
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shoplifting record and lack of transportation prevented 
Theresa from securing employment. 
Finally, her friends’ patience wore thin, and Theresa 
became homeless three months after emancipation from foster 
care. She went back to her county caseworker to ask for help, 
and was advised to go to an adult women’s shelter. 
In the shelter, Theresa quickly spiraled downhill. 
Several older women in the shelter, who had been homeless 
for years, offered drugs to Theresa as a way to feel better. 
Within weeks, Theresa was addicted to crack and living on the 
streets. She sold her body to pay for drugs, and lost touch with 
her friends from foster care. Theresa was incarcerated at the 
age of 19 for prostitution and possession of narcotics. During 
her time in jail, Theresa realized she had hit rock bottom and 
needed to change her life. 
In an attempt to rehabilitate her life, Theresa sought 
support from community service providers after her release 
from jail. She entered a supportive housing program designed 
to rehabilitate drug offenders. As she recovered from her 
addiction, Theresa worked to overcome her past, which 
included sealing her juvenile court record for the misdemeanor 
shoplifting conviction. A friend advised her to contact the 
Youth Outreach Project, a program at the Legal Aid Society of 
San Diego, Inc., that provides free legal services to former 
foster youth. With the help of an attorney, Theresa received a 
fee waiver from the court and successfully sealed her juvenile 
record. As a result, Theresa found minimum-wage 
employment within walking distance of her supportive 
housing program, and began the difficult task of building a life 
in the “real world.” 
 Unfortunately, Theresa’s story is a common one.2 The 
state, acting as Theresa’s legal custodian, failed to prepare her 
for emancipation from the sheltered world of foster care into 
adulthood. Suddenly on her own, without the support of her 
foster care caseworker, dependency attorney, or foster mother, 
Theresa was overwhelmed with the harsh realities of life after 
 
2 Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (2002-2004). 
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emancipation. Although the government removed Theresa 
from her natural home with the promise to take care of her, 
she ultimately suffered extensive harm as a direct result of the 
government’s failure to prepare her for adulthood. 
 Academics, lawmakers, and service providers have all 
recognized the need for extended services to foster youth. To 
date, however, none have acknowledged the constitutional 
right of foster youth to be prepared for emancipation while 
they are still in state care. This article contends foster youth 
possess a substantive due process right to be free from harm, 
and this right must include proper preparation for 
emancipation. It examines the current plight youth face when 
leaving foster care, and argues that youth who are unprepared 
for emancipation face substantial harm as they approach the 
age of 18 and beyond. Although recent federal legislation 
improved the structure of preparation services for foster youth, 
further legislative developments are necessary to protect 
emancipating youth from harm.3
 Part I of this article considers the current challenges 
facing youth preparing to leave foster care. Youth are failing 
to receive adequate preparation services while still in the 
custody of the government. Consequently, emancipated youth 
are disproportionately represented in homeless, unemployed, 
uneducated, and incarcerated populations.4 Part II examines 
the specific constitutional rights of youth in foster care. As 
persons in a custodial relationship with the government, foster 
youth have a substantive due process right to be free from 
physical and emotional harm. This protection includes 
services and training as required to “meet the basic needs” of a 
child.5 Emancipation preparation services are required to meet 
the basic needs of any foster child facing emancipation. Thus, 
failure to adequately provide such services harms children, in 
 
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 677 (Supp. 2002). 
4 See discussion infra Part I.A-D.  
5 Braam v. Washington, 81 P.3d 851, 857 (Wash. 2003) (substantive due 
process rights of foster youth include the right to adequate services to meet 
basic needs of a child); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318-
19 (1982) (liberty interests of persons in state custody require reasonable 
training to ensure safety). 
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violation of their substantive due process rights. Part III 
criticizes the legislative response to the plight of foster youth. 
Although federal and state legislative bodies are finally 
recognizing the importance of services designed to assist 
youth in the transition to adulthood, states consistently fail to 
prepare youth for emancipation.6 Part IV therefore proposes 
six concrete legislative recommendations, intended to 
encourage the government to fulfill its due process 
requirements and adequately prepare foster youth for 
adulthood. Specifically, the article recommends mandatory 
Independent Living Program (ILP) services, more efficient 
ILP services, mandatory legal skills training, expanded 
housing services, employment subsidies, and state statutory 
reforms. Part V recognizes the government’s responsibility to 
prepare foster youth for the “real world.” 
 
I. What Happens to Youth When They Leave Foster Care? 
Youth enter foster care for a multitude of reasons. 
Some enter the system as babies, while others may have no 
contact with a government agency until they are teenagers. 
Some children are “voluntarily” given up to foster care by 
parents who are unable to take care of them; others enter foster 
care as a result of the government’s decision to remove them 
“involuntarily” from abusive or neglectful homes. Extensive 
challenges exist for youth in foster care, including multiple 
foster home placements and repeated school transfers. In 
addition, foster youth are more likely to suffer from medical 
and psychological conditions. One study reported 50.6 percent 
of foster youth interviewed had been professionally diagnosed 
with a psychological disorder at some point in their 
childhood.7 For many youth, trauma experienced in childhood 
 
6 See discussion, infra Part III. 
7 CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, THE FOSTER CARE ALUMNI STUDIES, 
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF FOSTER CARE: EARLY RESULTS FROM THE CASEY 
NATIONAL ALUMNI STUDY 19 (2003) available at www.casey.org (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2005). The Casey Alumni Study included 1,609 foster care 
youth served by Casey Family Programs in 1998. 
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follows them into adulthood after they emancipate from foster 
care. 
Former foster care youth are an invisible population in 
America. Unlike other vulnerable populations, former foster 
youth do not usually self-identify once they have left state 
care.8 As a result, emancipated foster youth generally 
disappear with little fanfare into mainstream society. Without 
proper preparation for adulthood, however, emancipated foster 
youth are at high risks for homelessness, lack of education, 
unemployment, and incarceration. 
With some exceptions, most youth who “age out” of 
foster care do so at age 18.9 For the general population, the 
age of 18 represents freedom: the right to vote,10 to join the 
military,11 and to enter into contracts.12 But for foster youth, 
turning 18 and leaving foster care brings a new array of 
challenges. Without proper preparation, including a solid 
education or vocational plan, emancipation can bring 
unemployment and poverty. Failing to prepare youth for 
emancipation before the age of 18 results in harm, which often 
manifests itself after a youth has left foster care. Given the 
high incarceration and homelessness rates of former foster 
youth,13 society’s failure to prepare foster youth for the “real 
world” is creating a new population of young adults in 
poverty. 
 
8 Interview with anonymous ILP service provider in San Diego, Cal. (Jan. 
14, 2005). 
9 The age of emancipation differs in some regions. Many states, including 
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, and Washington, D.C., allow 
foster care youth to remain in the custody of the state until age 21. In 
California, youth may remain in foster care until age 19 if they are still in 
high school, and until 21 if they have learning or other disabilities. 
Telephone interview with Tammy Wilsker, Equal Justice Works Fellow, 
University of Miami Children & Youth Law Clinic (May 12, 2004). 
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
11 10 U.S.C. § 505 (2000). 
12 CAL. FAM. CODE § 6502 (West 2004) (establishing age of majority as 18 
years old). 
13 See statistical data, infra note 23.  
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A.  Homelessness 
Youth leaving foster care go to a wide variety of 
places. Because foster care payments to foster families and 
group homes officially end on the day the youth is 
emancipated, many youth must move out of their foster homes 
immediately upon turning 18. According to a national foster 
care alumni study conducted by Casey Family Programs, 
almost 10 percent of “permanent foster care” youth returned to 
their birth families immediately upon emancipation.14 Many 
youth return home in an attempt to repair the parental bond 
previously severed by foster care. Although returning to 
unstable homes can present new conflicts for vulnerable 
youth, studies have found foster youth who retain connections 
to their biological families fare better when they enter the 
“real world.”15
Some youth emancipating from foster care may stay a 
few extra weeks or months with supportive foster families 
who are willing to keep the youth beyond the final foster care 
payment. However, the 2003 Casey Alumni Study found that 
less than five percent of youth extended their stays with foster 
families.16 Other options for youth leaving foster care include 
Job Corps, military service, psychiatric treatment hospitals, or 
supportive adult living. The great majority of foster youth, 
however, move directly to “Independent Living” after foster 
care.17
Independent Living holds different meanings for 
different individuals. For some youth, emancipation provides 
the opportunity to live in their own apartments without the 
restrictions of foster parents or group homes. Additionally, 
Independent Living can be considered a crash course in 
adulthood: Youth must quickly learn to adapt to the world of 
 
14 CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 23.  
15 Mark E. Courtney & Richard P. Barth, Pathways of Older Adolescents 
Out of Foster Care: Implications for Independent Living Services,41 SOC. 
WORK 75, 81 (1996). 
16 CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 24.   
17 Id. (over 50 percent of youth emancipating from foster care go to 
Independent Living). 
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apartment leases, consumer and employment contracts, and 
other adult responsibilities. 
Certainly some high-functioning youth are able to 
adjust in the “real world.” However, the high learning curve of 
adulthood can be overwhelming for a foster youth on his or 
her own for the first time. Failure to secure gainful 
employment or educational loans can quickly lead to the 
downward spiral of homelessness. 
The proportion of foster youth who become homeless 
after emancipation is stunning. The Child Welfare League of 
America reported to Congress in 1999 that 40 percent of 
persons in federally funded homeless shelters were former 
foster youth.18 Indeed, a 2003 study found that 42.2 percent of 
emancipating foster youth nationwide have spent one or more 
nights homeless.19 Shockingly, 22.1 percent of youth were 
homeless for one or more nights within a year after 
emancipation.20 Almost one out of five youth (19.4 percent) 
were homeless for a week or more after leaving foster care.21
In California, the statistics are even higher: A 2002 
survey of California counties found that more than 65 percent 
of youth leaving foster care needed some form of shelter.22 
 
18 Challenges Confronting Children Aging out of Foster Care: Hearing 
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means Subcomm. on Human 
Resources, 106th Cong. (Mar. 9, 1999) (statement of Robin Nixon, 
Director for Youth Services Child Welfare League of America), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/humres/106cong/3-9-99/3-9nixo.htm (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2005) The Child Welfare League is one of the oldest and 
largest organizations in nation devoted to social policy on behalf of 
children. See www.cwla.org (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).   
19 CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 25; see also Daniel J. 
Brannen, Debunking the Year 18 Myth (Oct. 2002) available at 
http://www.kidsathome.org/year18.html. It is notoriously difficult to 
conduct research on former foster youth. Because of the transient nature of 
life after foster care and youth frustration with anything representing the 
“system,” emancipated youth often become unavailable for tracking 
studies. 
20 CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 25.  
21 Id. 
22 See CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVICES, INDEPENDENT LIVING 
PROGRAM POLICY UNIT, CHILD AND YOUTH PERMANENCY BRANCH, 
REPORT ON THE SURVEY OF THE HOUSING NEEDS OF EMANCIPATED 
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Homelessness is different for former foster youth than for the 
general population. Most emancipated youth do not go to 
public shelters or avail themselves of homeless services; 
having recently left the confines of foster care, emancipated 
youth are not eager to stay involved with “the system.”23 The 
large majority of homeless former foster youth are “invisible” 
to the general public; that is, they are “crashing” on a friend’s 
couch or sleeping in their cars.24
Under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance 
Act,25 the definition of homeless children and youth includes 
youth “who lack a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime 
residence,”26 as well as youth “sharing the housing of other 
persons due to loss of housing, economic hardship, or a 
similar reason.”27 Additionally, youth who have “a primary 
nighttime residence that is a public or private place not 
designed for, or ordinarily used as, regular sleeping 
accommodations for human beings,” including cars, parks, 
public spaces, are considered homeless under the federal 
definition.28
Thus, applying the McKinney-Vento Act, all 
emancipated foster youth sleeping in cars, crashing on friends’ 
couches, or sharing unstable homes are, by definition, 
homeless. For any homeless person, lack of housing presents a 
host of competing problems, including lack of food and 
adequate medical care. But emancipated youth are already 
facing an uneven playing field when they leave foster care. 
Many are truly alone, without support from either birth 
families or their former foster care community. Homeless 
 
FOSTER/PROBATION YOUTH 1 (2002). Additionally, in a June 2004 
interview with eight former foster youth in San Diego, all eight youth had 
experienced some form of homelessness in the years after foster care. 
Interview with members of the National Association of Former Foster Care 
Youth, in San Diego, Cal. (June 2, 2004). 
23 Interview with anonymous ILP service provider, supra note 8. 
24 Id. 
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431-11435 (Supp. 2002). 
26 § 11434a(2)(A). 
27 § 11434a(2)(B)(i). 
28 §§ 11434a(2)(B)(ii)-(iii). 
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emancipated youth must grapple with both the realities of 
unstable living and the lingering trauma of life in foster care. 
Without proper preparation for life in the “real world,” 
a temporary spell of homelessness can create lifetime 
problems for an emancipated youth. Association with peers in 
similar situations can encourage youth to join gangs to find a 
sense of community. Additionally, as in Theresa’s case, youth 
frustrated by a lack of resources and educational opportunities 
may turn to drug use. Either of these options, which may be 
tempting to a youth facing homelessness, can result in 
incarceration. 
Stable housing is the prerequisite to successful 
independent living. Unless federal, local, and state 
governments can increase housing resources for this 
population, the negative effects of homelessness will continue 
to cause substantial harm to the lives of emancipated youth. 
  
B.  Lack of Education 
Education brings empowerment and can open avenues 
of employment for a youth facing the “real world” on his or 
her own. However, foster youth are more likely to fail in 
school than their non-foster care peers. A 2004 survey of 732 
youths by the Chapin Hall Center for Children at the 
University of Chicago found foster youth: 
[A]re at a higher risk of being held back a 
grade, are twice as likely to have been 
suspended from school, and four times as likely 
to have been expelled.29  
 
 
29 MARK E. COURTNEY, ET AL., CHAPIN HALL CENTER FOR CHILDREN AT 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE ADULT 
FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH 42 (2004). The Chapin Hall 
Center for Children at the University of Chicago is a research and 
development center, conducting non-partisan research on children’s issues. 
See http://www.about.chapinhall.org/index.html (last visited Aug. 27, 
2004).   
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Though the surveyed youth were age 17 and mostly in 
the upper grades of high school, their average reading ability 
was at the seventh grade level.30
Data from prior studies of foster youth in education 
show equally dismal results. A rare national study of foster 
care alumni in 1991 found only 54 percent of youth had 
completed high school.31 More recently, a May 2002 study of 
emancipating foster youth in California found only six percent 
of females and seven percent of males passed the GED 
exam.32 For youth emancipating from the probation system, 
the numbers were slightly higher: Approximately 16 percent 
of females and 14 percent of males passed the GED exam.33 
Incredibly, these statistics show that incarcerated youth are 
better prepared for the GED exam than foster care youth. In 
addition, although 55 percent of emancipated youth attended 
community college after exiting foster care, only two percent 
actually earned an Associate of Arts (AA) degree. In contrast, 
37 percent of general population students who attend 
community college complete an AA degree.34
Legal problems can also prevent emancipated youth 
from accessing education. For example, because most foster 
youths’ social security numbers are accessible to many people, 
identity theft is common. As seen in several Youth Outreach 
Project cases, a youth applying for financial aid who is a 
victim of identity theft may be denied the financial ability to 
go to school.35    
 
30 Id. at 45.   
31 R. Cook, et al, Executive Summary to A NATIONAL EVALUATION OF 
TITLE IV-E FOSTER CARE INDEPENDENT LIVING PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH: 
PHASE 2 FINAL REPORT, at xiv (Westat 1991).   
32 BARBARA NEEDELL, ET AL., CENTER FOR SOCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH, 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BERKELEY, YOUTH EMANCIPATING FROM 
FOSTER CARE IN CALIFORNIA: FINDINGS USING LINKED ADMINISTRATIVE 
DATA 57 (May 2002) available at 
http://cssr.berkeley.edu/childwelfare/pdfs/youth/ffy_entire.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2005). 
33 Id. at 58. 
34 Id. at 60. 
35 Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (2002-2004). 
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The data is clear: The educational and foster care 
systems are consistently failing to educate youth while they 
are still in foster care, and the results of these failures follow 
youth after emancipation. Lack of education, combined with a 
lack of family support and social connections, relegates a 
foster youth with no job skills to unemployment or minimum 
wage jobs. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that 35 percent of 
emancipated youth received some type of welfare assistance in 
the year after emancipation.36 By ignoring the educational 
dilemmas of youth in foster care, society inhibits their 
potential for success in the “real world.” 
 
C.  Lack of Employment 
In addition to stable housing and educational 
opportunities, stable employment is a crucial component of a 
youth’s successful transition from foster care. Unfortunately, 
foster youth are ill-prepared for the challenges of working in 
the “real world.” In 2002, a study found that no more than 45 
percent of youth who aged out of foster care in California, 
Illinois, and South Carolina were working for income.37 In 
2004, the numbers were lower; one study revealed that only 
35.1 percent of youth who aged out of foster care in the 
Midwest were currently employed.38 However, even former 
 
36 COURTNEY, ET AL., supra note 29, at 43. 
37 ROBERT GOERGE, ET AL., CHAPIN HALL CENTER FOR CHILDREN AT THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES FOR YOUTH AGING 
OUT OF FOSTER CARE 15 (2003). Of course, some youth may begin 
working prior to their 18th birthday, while they are still in foster care. The 
Chapin Hall Center for Children found in 2002 that half of youth aging out 
of foster care in California and Illinois, and two-thirds in South Carolina, 
worked for pay before turning 18. Id at 11. Learning job skills while in 
foster care is important; in addition to encouraging responsibility and 
confidence, California, and South Carolina youth who did not work during 
their time in foster care had only slightly more than a 50-50 chance of 
being employed upon exit from foster care. Id.    
38 COURTNEY, ET AL., supra note 29, at 46. 
392 UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy Vol. 9:2 
  
                                                
foster youth who earn income rarely make enough to meet 
their financial needs.39
The high unemployment rate for emancipated youth 
can be traced to a number of causes. Lack of education, as 
described above, prevents youth from being able to get stable 
and higher-paying jobs. Youth without training in résumé 
preparation, job interviewing, and work skills are at a distinct 
disadvantage when applying for jobs.40 For many youth, 
medical and psychological problems experienced while in 
foster care were never fully addressed or remedied.41 Youth 
who are currently homeless, or who experienced the instability 
of multiple placements while in foster care, can have difficulty 
adapting to a steady work environment. 
Legal factors can also contribute to unemployment. 
For example, unless a youth with a juvenile court record is 
able to seal his/her record, the fact that a youth has a 
delinquency record can work against him/her in the search for 
employment.42 Such was the case of “Jana,” a 20-year-old 
former foster youth who was arrested at age 17 for petty theft. 
Although Jana had emancipated from foster care into a stable 
living environment and was studying for a degree in 
education, she was denied employment from two child-care 
agencies because both refused to hire persons with 
convictions.43 With the help of an attorney from the Youth 
 
39 GOERGE, supra note 37, at 18 (mean earnings for California youth in the 
first quarter after their 18th birthday is $1558.85, or $6,235.40 per year). 
According to the 2004 Health and Human Services Poverty Guidelines, the 
poverty guideline for one person in the United States is $9,310 per year. 
See United States Department of Health and Human Services, The 2004 
HHS Poverty Guidelines, available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/04poverty.shtml (last visited June 25, 2004). 
40 Some foster youth receive such services in Independent Living Skills 
classes. However, such classes may not be the most effective way to teach 
skills to this population. See discussion infra Part V.B.  
41 CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 7, at 24. 
42 Interview with anonymous ILP service provider, supra note 8. 
43 Youth Outreach Project case study, San Diego, Cal. (May 2004). 
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Outreach Project, Jana sealed her juvenile record and obtained 
employment in an after-school program.44
For youth who are able to secure jobs, the workplace 
can sometimes become a hostile place. Former foster youth, 
who usually do not have family or community support, can be 
easily intimidated by employers. Intimidation can take the 
form of harassment, discrimination, and unpaid wages.45 
These issues affect an individual’s ability to retain stable 
employment, and present major obstacles for former foster 
youth attempting to become contributing members of society. 
 
D.  Crime/Incarceration 
Given the housing, educational, and employment 
barriers facing foster youth upon emancipation, it is perhaps 
not surprising that a disproportionate number of former foster 
youth turn to crime. A 2004 study by the Chapin Hall Center 
for Children at the University of Chicago found more than half 
of emancipated foster youth had been arrested, more than one-
third spent at least one night at a correctional facility, and one-
fifth reported being convicted of a crime.46
A clear connection exists between foster care and 
crime. Although male foster youth are more likely than 
females to land in the juvenile justice system,47 over two-fifths 
of both males and females report a history of perpetrating 
violence.48 Without proper support, including rehabilitative 
counseling, housing, and job training services, youth who 
 
44 Id. Many youth are not as fortunate, and their juvenile record remains a 
problem into adulthood. See, e.g., Youth Outreach Project case files, San 
Diego, Cal. (Aug. 2004). 
45 Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 2004). 
Harassment, discrimination, and unpaid wages are the three most common 
and most serious employment law issues faced by YOP clients. 
46 COURTNEY, ET AL., supra note 29, at 48. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 50. Additionally, youth who have multiple placements while in 
foster care are more likely to have a state prison record. NEEDELL, ET AL., 
supra note 32, at 72. 
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learn violence early in life can find it difficult to manage life 
on their own. 
Those who have juvenile court records, and are on 
juvenile probation before emancipating, are more likely to 
enter the state prison system when they leave foster care.49 
Approximately half of emancipated male youth with state 
prison records committed violent or serious offenses.50 The 
statistics are especially revealing for males who were on 
probation while in foster care: Thirty-two percent of African-
American males, 18 percent of white males, and 42 percent of 
Hispanic males who were on juvenile probation entered the 
state prison system within seven years of emancipation.51
These statistics serve as a distress signal to 
policymakers and service providers, and are even more 
disturbing because each of these youth had some contact with 
county services, through probation or foster care, before 
becoming adult offenders. In addition, the statistics show 
youth of color disproportionately commit crime, 
demonstrating the failure of county services to adequately 
address the needs of children of color. 
Clearly, successful rehabilitation of juvenile offenders 
must include preparation for life outside of “the system.” This 
preparation should include the sealing of juvenile court 
records and proper counseling to enable a juvenile to break the 
pattern of criminal behavior. Without sufficient resources to 
ensure stable housing, education, and employment for 
emancipating foster youth, society may ultimately pay the 
higher costs of incarceration.52 Indeed, failure to prepare youth 
 
49 COURTNEY, ET AL., supra note 29 at 76. Indeed, nine percent of African-
American males, five percent of white males, and six percent of Hispanic 
males entered the state prison system within seven years of emancipation 
from the foster care system.  
50 Id. at 71. 
51 Id. at 77. 
52 The average cost of incarceration in California, per inmate per year, is 
$23,406. San Francisco AIDS Foundation, Support Proposition 36: 
Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act, available at 
http://www.sfaf.org/policy/prop36.html (last modified Oct. 2, 2000). In 
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for adulthood before emancipation can result in substantial 
emotional and physical harm, for both individuals and the 
larger community.  
 
E.  The Youth Outreach Project 
In response to the dire legal needs of foster youth and 
emancipated foster youth, the Legal Aid Society of San Diego 
created the Youth Outreach Project (YOP) in 2002.53 With 
generous support from the Equal Justice Works foundation 
and Morrison & Foerster, LLP, the Youth Outreach Project 
(YOP) was the first program in the nation to provide civil 
legal services specifically to former foster youth and 
emancipated youth.54 Through outreach clinics in drop-in 
centers, and referrals, YOP is now bringing legal services into 
the lives of this vulnerable population. In its 24 months of 
existence, YOP has assisted over 125 clients in San Diego 
County.55 The legal needs of the youth vary widely, from 
major housing and education issues to simple parking ticket 
disputes.56 Additionally, many youth are victims of identity 
theft, often perpetrated by their biological parents.57 With 
legal assistance, many of the barriers facing these youth can be 
remedied. 
YOP also focuses on policy issues affecting 
emancipating foster youth. For example, several YOP clients 
were unable to seal their juvenile records due to prohibitively 
expensive court fees. 58 The proper sealing of juvenile records 
ensures potential employers and most government agencies do 
not have access to a youth’s juvenile record after he or she 
turns 18. However, a youth must petition the juvenile or 
 
contrast, providing a rent subsidy of, for example, $500 per month to a 
former foster youth would cost taxpayers only $6,000 per year. 
53 See Dana Littlefield, Former Foster Children Get Legal Help, SAN 
DIEGO UNION TRIB., Dec. 30, 2003, at B1. 
54 Id.  
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family court to seal the record, and usually must pay a fee for 
the court processing.59 Although most jurisdictions provide a 
waiver process, San Diego required mandatory fees of up to 
$120 to seal a juvenile record.60  
Recent advocacy by YOP brought this issue to the 
attention of the Presiding Judge of the Juvenile Court in April 
2004, and resulted in the establishment of a fee waiver process 
for indigent people wishing to seal their juvenile records.61 
The victory was significant; without a fee waiver process, 
indigent youth would be barred from access to this court 
service, resulting in yet another barrier to a youth’s potential 
success. 
 
II.  Substantive Due Process Protection for Foster Youth 
 
A.  The Right to be Free from Harm 
Clearly, the government’s failure to prepare a youth for 
emancipation can cause substantial harm both before and after 
a youth’s exit from foster care. In some cases, harm stemming 
from lack of emancipation preparation becomes apparent 
before a foster youth turns 18. For example, a parenting teen’s 
lack of training for adulthood can result in the permanent 
termination of the youth’s parental rights.62 In other cases, 
such harm is manifested after the youth has emancipated, as 
illustrated by statistical outcomes demonstrating foster youths’ 
challenges in the “real world.”63   
 
59 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 903.3 (West 2004). 
60 Id.  
61 Memorandum from Dick Rothschild, Western Center on Law and 
Poverty, Inc., to People Interested in Access to Court Issues (May 2004), 
available at www.wclp.org/files/MAIL-22-1.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 
2005). See CAL. R. OF CT., R. 985 (revised Jan. 1, 2005) (establishing fee 
waiver process for indigent applicants).  
62 See, e.g., Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 
2004). 
63 Interview with anonymous ILP service provider, supra note 8. The 
concept of liability for delayed manifestation of harm may be analogized to 
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However, because foster youth are in state custody, the 
state has a duty to protect them from harm based on the 
doctrine of substantive due process. In addition to “fair 
process,” the liberty interest protected by substantive due 
process “includes more than the absence of physical 
restraint.”64 The jurisprudence of substantive due process 
supports the extension of this protection to emancipation 
services to properly prepare youth for life after foster care and 
protect them from harm.   
Substantive due process protects individual liberty 
from government actions regardless of the fairness of the 
procedures used to implement those actions.65 For individuals 
not in government custody, due process provides defensive 
protection from interference with rights. For the most 
vulnerable members of society, however, the liberty interests 
protected under substantive due process can become matters 
of great importance. When the government assumes 
responsibility for individuals in custody, such as youth in 
foster care, it also confers affirmative constitutional 
protections on these individuals.66 Therefore, because the law 
grants additional due process benefits to youth in foster care, 
the “deprivation of those benefits takes on constitutional 
dimensions.”67  
Courts have particularly appreciated the significance of 
liberty rights for individuals placed into a custodial 
relationship with the state, including institutionalized and 
incarcerated individuals. Three Supreme Court decisions are 
especially relevant in this context.   
 
violations of school duties. When a school fails to properly teach reading, 
the failure manifests itself in a child’s inability to read. Although the cause 
of the problem is the failure to properly educate while the child was in 
school, the evidence of the problem — the child’s illiteracy — is 
sometimes not noticed until the child is much older. 
64 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). 
65 Interport Pilots Agency, Inc. v. Sammis, 14 F.3d 133, 144 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted). 
66 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1982).   
67 LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 993 (1991).   
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In Estelle v. Gamble,68 the Supreme Court held states 
are required under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual 
punishment clause69 to provide medical care to incarcerated 
prisoners. The plaintiff in Estelle, J.W. Gamble, was a 
prisoner with serious medical problems, including back pain 
and high blood pressure.70 Prison guards repeatedly denied his 
request to see a doctor.71 Gamble filed a complaint pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging prison officials subjected him to 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.72 The District Court dismissed Gamble’s 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted.73 The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court 
and remanded the case, ordering reinstatement of the 
complaint.74 In considering Gamble’s Eighth Amendment 
claim, the Supreme Court held prison officials’ deliberate 
indifference to a prisoner’s serious injury or illness is a 
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual 
punishment clause.75 Because custodial prisoners must rely on 
prison officials to treat medical needs, the Court held 
government officials may be held liable for failure to provide 
such care.76  
The Court applied a similar analysis, though a different 
legal standard, to the context of involuntarily committed 
individuals in Youngberg v. Romeo.77 Nicholas Romeo, a 
 
68 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
69 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
70 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 101.  
71 Id. 
72 Id.    
73 Id. at 98. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 104-05. 
76 Id. 
77 457 U.S. 307 (1982). The Estelle Court applied a deliberate indifference 
standard to determine liability for violations of due process. However, the 
Estelle Court’s analysis was grounded in the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. In Youngberg, the Court 
applied a more demanding professional judgment standard for 
involuntarily committed individuals. A thorough discussion of this issue 
can be found in Brendan Kearse, Abused Again: Competing Constitutional 
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mentally retarded individual, was involuntarily committed to a 
Pennsylvania state institution. While in state custody, Romeo 
suffered numerous injuries as a result of his own violence and 
actions of the other residents.78 Romeo’s mother became 
concerned and brought suit in federal court, alleging state 
officials knew, or should have known, her son was suffering 
injuries but “failed to institute appropriate preventive 
procedures, thus violating [Romeo’s] rights under the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.”79 After the filing of the 
complaint, Romeo was transferred to the hospital to treat a 
broken arm. In the hospital ward and by order of a doctor, he 
was physically restrained during the day to protect himself and 
other patients. By agreement of the parties involved in the 
litigation, Romeo remained in the hospital and did not return 
to the institution. A second amended complaint was 
subsequently filed, alleging the state was failing to provide 
Romeo with “appropriate treatment or programs for his mental 
retardation.”80  
During an eight-day trial, a federal jury was instructed 
on the defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights. The jury was 
instructed that only if they found the defendants: 
[D]eliberately indifferent to the serious medical 
and psychological needs of the defendant could 
they find that his Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights had been violated.81
The jury ultimately returned a verdict for the defendants.82
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a 
new trial. The Court of Appeals held the Eighth Amendment 
was not the appropriate source for the determination of rights 
of involuntarily committed persons. Rather, according to the 
court, the Fourteenth Amendment was more appropriate 
 
Standards for the State’s Duty to Protect Foster Children, 29 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 385 (1992).  
78 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309. 
79 Id. at 310.    
80 Id. at 311. 
81 Id. at 312 (internal citations omitted). 
82 Id. 
400 UC Davis Journal of Juvenile Law & Policy Vol. 9:2 
  
                                                
because the involuntarily committed “retain liberty interests in 
freedom of movement and in personal security.”83 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the substantive 
rights of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.84 While determining that 
committed persons possessed constitutionally protected liberty 
interests under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, 
the Court found these interests require government to “provide 
minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and 
freedom from undue restraint.”85 With this decision, the Court 
established a minimum level of affirmative state duties toward 
individuals held in civil state custody. As mandated by 
substantive due process, these duties include such training as 
required to assure a committed individual’s safety.86 Although 
the Court emphasized courts must show deference to 
“qualified professionals” in determining exactly what 
constitutes “reasonable” training,87 the constitutional liberty 
interest in such training or services is essential to preventing 
individual harm. 
Seven years after Youngberg was decided, the 
Supreme Court considered a third case regarding the 
substantive due process rights of individuals in state custody, 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept of Social Servs.88 
Joshua DeShaney, a young child, lived with his physically 
 
83 Id. at 312-13.   
84 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 314. 
85 Id. at 319. 
86 Id. at 324. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun noted the recognized 
liberty interest of committed persons includes such training as required to 
“prevent unreasonable losses of additional liberty as a result of his 
confinement.” Id. at 327. For example, if a person entered a state 
institution with certain self-care skills, but then lost those skills “because of 
the State’s unreasonable refusal to provide him training,” the person may 
allege a “loss of liberty quite distinct from — and as serious as — the loss 
of safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints.” Id. In this way, the 
ability to take care of oneself is just as essential as one’s safety. This is 
especially true in the context of former foster youth. Without basic life 
skills, emancipated foster youth face impossible challenges in the “real 
world.”  
87 Id. at 322. 
88 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
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abusive father, who beat him on numerous occasions. 
Although the county Department of Social Services was aware 
of Joshua’s violent home life and took “various steps to 
protect him,” they did not act to remove Joshua from his 
father’s custody. 89 Indeed, although the Department was 
notified repeatedly by hospital emergency room staff that 
Joshua was being treated for suspected child abuse, the county 
did not take action. Ultimately, after a series of beatings, 
Joshua’s father beat him severely and caused permanent brain 
damage, rendering Joshua “profoundly retarded.”90
Joshua’s mother and guardian ad litem filed suit on his 
behalf against the county, the Department of Social Services, 
and several of its employees. The suit, brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, alleged the state’s failure to intervene to 
protect Joshua “against a risk of violence at his father’s hands 
of which they knew or should have known”91 violated 
Joshua’s Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty and due 
process of law. 
The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
state defendants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, 
finding the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not require a state or local government entity to protect 
citizens from “private violence, or other mishaps not 
attributable to the conduct of its employees.”92
The Supreme Court, in a six-to-three decision, 
affirmed the lower courts’ decision.93 The Court held the state 
does not have a Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect a child 
who has been in the parent’s custody at all times.94 However, 
the Court recognized that “in certain limited circumstances the 
Constitution imposed upon the State affirmative duties of care 
and protection with respect to particular individuals.”95 In 
addition, the Court also noted the possibility that due process 
 
89 Id. at 189. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 193. 
92 Id. at 194. 
93 Id. at 190. 
94 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201. 
95 Id. at 198.    
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rights could exist in the context of foster care. In a famed 
footnote, the Court suggested that: 
[H]ad the State by the affirmative exercise of 
its power removed Joshua from free society and 
placed him in a foster home operated by its 
agents, we might have a situation sufficiently 
analogous to incarceration or institutional-
ization to give rise to an affirmative duty to 
protect.96  
By analogizing the situations of foster youth with those 
of voluntarily institutionalized persons, the Court recognized 
in dicta that the government creates a special custodial 
relationship when it removes children from their natural 
parents to place them in foster care.97 Because foster youth 
enter into a custodial relationship with the government, they 
are deserving of the same protection and state duties mandated 
by Youngberg.98
Much like Youngberg’s plaintiff, foster children are 
placed “in a custodial environment, and …[are] unable to seek 
alternative living arrangements.”99 When the state accepts a 
child into foster care, it assumes responsibility for the safety of 
the child.100 In addition, youth in foster care lose the freedom 
 
96 Id. at 201 n.9. 
97 Id. The Court noted the findings of several Courts of Appeals that foster 
youth, as persons in state custody, have a Due Process right to be protected 
from harm. See, e.g., Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 
134, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1987).   
98 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9. See Norfleet v. Arkansas Dep’t of 
Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Doe, 649 F.2d 
at 141 (“When individuals are placed in custody or under the care of the 
government, their governmental custodians are sometimes charged with 
affirmative duties, the nonfeasance of which may violate the 
constitution.”). 
99 Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989). 
100 See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F. 2d 
1364, 1372 (3d Cir. 1991); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 
1990); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (once a person is in state 
custody, state has constitutional “duty to assume some responsibility for 
[the person’s] safety and general well-being”).
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and ability to make choices for themselves, and must rely on 
the state for basic survival.101   
The Supreme Court has not yet extended the due 
process rights defined by Youngberg to foster youth. However, 
since DeShaney, numerous circuit courts have held that 
children placed in foster care have a liberty interest to be free 
from harm, giving the state a duty to protect them from such 
harm.102 These cases reflect a nationwide trend of federal 
courts expanding the substantive due process rights of foster 
youth to be free from harm while in the care of the state.103
State courts are also recognizing the significance of 
substantive due process rights for foster youth. In Braam v. 
State of Washington,104 a class action lawsuit brought against 
the Washington Department of Social and Health Services on 
behalf of youth in foster care, the Supreme Court of 
Washington noted that its decision to uphold foster children’s 
substantive due process right was consistent with “the weight 
of authority among our sister courts.”105 American courts are 
clearly moving toward the expansion of substantive due 
process rights for this population. 
Since it is established precedent that foster youth have 
a constitutional right to be free from harm, the question 
becomes “not whether they are entitled to protection from 
harm, but rather, how broad that protection must be.”106 
Clearly, courts require the right to adequate food, clothing, 
and medical attention for custodial persons.107 Also implicit in 
this substantive due process protection is the “right to be free 
 
101 Norfleet, 989 F.2d at 293. 
102 See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc); 
Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990); Murphy, 
914 F.2d at 846; Norfleet, 989 F.2d 289; Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep’t of 
Human Servs., 959 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1992); Roska v. Peterson, 304 F.3d 
982, 994 (10th Cir. 2002); Taylor ex rel. Walker, 818 F.2d at 794.     
103 See, e.g., Nicini, 212 F.3d at 807 (“After DeShaney, many of our sister 
courts of appeals held that foster children have a due process right to be 
free from harm at the hands of state-regulated foster parents”). 
104 Braam v. Washington, 81 P.3d. 851 (Wash. 2003). 
105 Id. at 856. 
106 Marisol A. v. Guiliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 675 (1996).    
107 Id.; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).    
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from unreasonable risk of harm, including a risk flowing from 
the lack of basic services, and a right to reasonable safety.”108 
This is especially true because foster youth rely on the state 
for protection from harm.109  
Courts have further defined this protection to include 
the freedom from “unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions 
upon their physical and emotional well-being.”110 
Significantly, this right goes beyond mere protection from 
physical harm and encompasses protection from psychological 
and emotional harm.111 Because children in foster care are in a 
developmental time of life, emotional and psychological 
injuries can “cause more lasting damage than many strictly 
physical injuries.”112 This is especially true for youth 
preparing to emancipate from foster care. Notwithstanding the 
possibilities of physical harm, failure to adequately prepare 
youth for adulthood creates emotional harm. Along with long-
term effects of emotional injuries suffered while in foster care, 
the fear and frustration felt by many emancipating youth as 
they transition to adulthood can cause depression and other 
mental illnesses. 113
In addition to basic protection from physical and 
emotional harm, courts have also recognized affirmative state 
duties, such as a foster youth’s right to appropriate placement 
 
108 Braam, 81 P.3d at 857. 
109 LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 993 (1991).   
110 B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1396 (N.D. Ill. 1989).    
111 White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects aspects of 
emotional well-being); Marisol A., 929 F. Supp. at 675; see also LaShawn 
A., 762 F. Supp. at 992-93; Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 
1009-10 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“the fact that the plaintiff’s injuries are 
psychological rather than physical is of no moment.”); Doe v. New York 
City Dep’t of Social Servs., 670 F. Supp. 1145, 1175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 
Ashleigh Danielle v. Adriazola, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (2003). 
112 B.H., 715 F. Supp. at 1395. 
113 A 2004 study found “foster youth suffer from more mental health 
problems than the general population.” COURTNEY, ET AL., supra note 29, 
at 31. These youth are at elevated risk of developing Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder and substance use disorders. The risks are especially high for 
youth transitioning from foster care into Independent Living. Id. 
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and case planning.114 A foster child’s recognizable liberty 
interest additionally requires the custodial state to provide 
training as necessary to prevent the occurrence of harm to a 
child. Such training should be designed to include “adequate 
services to meet the basic needs of the child.”115
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
considered the specific nature of services to be provided in 
LaShawn A. v. Dixon.116 Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit 
on behalf of foster care children and children who were not yet 
in the system but were “known to the department because of 
the reported abuse or neglect.”117 The complaint alleged both 
statutory and constitutional violations in the administration of 
the foster care system in Washington, D.C.118 At the 
conclusion of a two-week trial, with substantial testimonial 
evidence of the system’s failures, the court held the 
government was liable under both state and federal law.119   
The court found the rights of foster children to be 
analogous to the rights of the involuntarily committed, such as 
the plaintiff in Youngberg. The court further noted that: 
[W]hether plaintiffs have a liberty interest in 
any specific services is a … difficult question, 
analogous to the question of training addressed 
by the Supreme Court in Youngberg.120  
 
 
114 LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 993; Palmer v. Cuomo, 503 N.Y.S. 2d 20, 
21 (1986) (state has a state statutory duty to provide aid to youth in foster 
care). Courts have found various due process obligations on the part of 
states to assist foster youth in the exercise of their constitutional rights, 
including the right to family association. See, e.g., Aristotle P., 721 F. 
Supp. 1002. 
115 Braam v. Washington, 81 P.3d. 851, 857 (Wash. 2003).; see also 
Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1982) (state must provide “minimally 
adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety.”); Kevin M. Ryan, 
Stemming the Tide of Foster Care Runaways: a Due Process Perspective, 
42 CATH. U. L. REV. 271, 308 (1993).   
116 762 F. Supp. 959 (1991), aff’d, 144 F.3d 847 (1998). 
117 Id. at 960. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 961. 
120 Id. at 993. 
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The court emphasized: 
[I]t is important to keep in mind that plaintiffs 
did not come into the District’s care by choice 
… . They are children and rely on the District 
to protect them from harm and ensure their 
well-being.121  
The court held: 
[T]o the extent that certain services, such as 
appropriate placements and case planning, are 
essential to preventing harm to the children in 
the District’s custody … children have a 
constitutional liberty interest in those 
services.122   
Following this reasoning, children in foster care have a 
constitutional liberty interest in any service or training 
essential to preventing harm. When the state fails to prepare 
foster youth for life after emancipation, youth overwhelmingly 
suffer from both physical and emotional harm.123 
Emancipation services are therefore necessary for a state to 
meet the “basic needs” of a foster youth and to protect that 
youth from harm, both before and after they enter the “real 
world.” 
 
B.  The Voluntary or Involuntary Distinction 
Recent court decisions have distinguished the rights of 
foster youth based on voluntary or involuntary placement into 
foster care. Circuit courts considering the issue have generally 
found that substantive due process rights attach to 
involuntarily placed foster children because the state is 
responsible for removing the child from the home.124 In turn, 
 
121 Id. 
122 LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 993. 
123 See discussion, infra Part I. 
124 See Yvonne L., 959 F.2d 883, 891; Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 
818 F.2d 791, 796 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989) 
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lower courts faced with the subject have restricted their 
discussion of substantive due process rights, applying the right 
to be free from harm only to youth involuntarily placed into 
foster care.125 For example, the Eleventh Circuit analogized 
the situation of involuntarily placed foster youth to 
involuntarily committed individuals, noting: 
In both cases, the state involuntarily placed the 
person in a custodial environment, and in both 
cases, the person is unable to seek alternative 
living arrangements.126  
Though this analogy is valid, it needlessly excludes 
voluntarily placed foster children from the protections of due 
process.   
Such restrictive reasoning in this context has a 
dangerous effect on due process jurisprudence. Although 
courts are moving toward expansion of substantive due 
process protection to include services for foster youth, courts 
seem to be unnecessarily withholding such protection from a 
significant proportion of foster care youth. Essentially, 
children who are forcibly removed from their parents by the 
state will have due process protections, while children who 
were “given up” to foster care would not.127 In effect, these 
recent court decisions are creating two parallel foster care 
systems: one with constitutional protections for 
“involuntarily” placed children, and one without such 
protections for children whose parents “voluntarily” placed 
 
(children involuntarily placed in foster care are situated similarly to a 
prisoner involuntarily placed in an institution); K.H. v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 
846, 848-49 (7th Cir. 1990).   
125 See Ashleigh Danielle v. Adriazola, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (S.D. 
Fla. 2003); Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F. Supp. 320, 334-35 (E.D. Penn 
1993); Aristotle P. v. Johnson, 721 F. Supp. 1002, 1009 (N.D. Ill 1989).    
126 Taylor ex rel. Walker, 818 F.2d at 795. 
127 See McMahon v. Tompkins County, No. 95-CV-1134, 1998 WL 
187421, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1998).     
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them in state custody. This distinction is arbitrary, and its 
result is “neither acceptable nor constitutionally sound.”128  
Moreover, faced with the difficulties of poverty, 
parents are often forced to transfer children into foster care 
because of circumstances beyond their control. As the 
Supreme Court recognized in 1977, “[t]the poor have little 
choice but to submit to state-supervised child care when 
family crises strike.”129 Some struggling parents may believe 
that transferring custody to the foster care system will result in 
improved living situations for their children; if such children 
were not entitled to the full spectrum of constitutional rights, 
parents would have an incentive to keep children in troubled 
homes until the state finally intervened. Such a result benefits 
neither the state nor the child and family. Courts weighing 
such issues must consider the full effects of denying 
substantive due process rights to individuals equally in state 
custody. The substantive due process rights of foster youth 
must include adequate services, regardless of how they came 
to be in the care of the state. Because exposing a foster youth 
to “an unreasonable risk of harm violates the due process 
clause,” states have an affirmative constitutional duty to 
provide services designed to prepare a youth for life after 
foster care.130  
 
III.  Duty of Government 
Emancipating inadequately prepared foster youth into 
the “real world” causes substantial harm, and the state 
therefore has a duty to ensure youth are ready for 
 
128 Id.; see also Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 
1990) (court held that the due process right to be free from harm extends to 
plaintiff foster children, who were “relinquished” into foster care by their 
grandfather).   
129 Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
834 (1977); Ryan, supra note 115, at n.176 (noting that studies suggest that 
some social workers are inclined to favor continued placement in foster 
care with a “higher-status” family over reunification with a child’s low-
income natural family). 
130 Braam v. Washington, 81 P.3d. 851, 857 (Wash. 2003). 
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emancipation. Fortunately, both state and federal governments 
recently recognized this duty and passed legislation benefiting 
former foster youth. While this legislation provides an 
excellent starting point for change, it falls short of truly 
improving the perilous situations of youth living on the edge. 
 
A.  Legislative Response: The Chafee Act 
Confronted with extensive evidence of the plight of 
former foster youth, the federal government created the Foster 
Care Independence Act of 1999.131 Former President Clinton 
signed the act into law on December 14, 1999, and the law 
was deemed a “great victory” for former foster youth.132 The 
Act (Chafee Act) established the John H. Chafee Foster Care 
Independence Program, named in honor of the late Sen. 
Chafee (R-RI), who originally sponsored the legislation.133  
The Chafee Act brought needed improvements to 
Independent Living Programs (ILP) for foster youth and 
emancipated youth.134 The purpose of the Act was to provide 
States with “flexible funding” to “enable programs to be 
designed and conducted” to assist former foster youth.135 This 
flexibility was intended to allow states to serve children of 
various ages and at various stages of independence, including 
those under age 16.136 States are also allowed to serve children 
and young adults in different parts of the state differently, and 
 
131 42 U.S.C. §677(a) (Supp. 2002).  
132 Raudi P. Guinn, Passage of the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999: 
A Pivotal Step on Behalf of Youth Aging Out of Foster Care and Into a Life 
of Poverty, 7 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y, 403, 409 (2000).   
133 Id.   
134 Independent Living Programs are designed to train youth for adult life. 
Though the programs vary by state and county, most programs include 
training (such as budgeting classes, résumé workshops, and interview 
skills) and access to specialized caseworkers for assistance. 
135 § 677 (a). 
136 § 677(b)(2)(C). 
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can use a variety of providers and contractors to deliver 
independent living services.137  
In addition to emphasizing state flexibility, the Chafee 
Act establishes accountability for states as they implement 
Independent Living Programs. The Chafee Act requires the 
Secretary of State to develop outcome measures to be used to 
assess the performance of states.138 Thus, as the federal 
government monitors the provision of services to former foster 
youth, states may be held accountable when they violate the 
due process rights of youth by failing to prepare them for 
emancipation. 
Significantly, the Chafee Act doubled federal funding 
for the Independent Living Program, from $70 million to $140 
million per year.139 Funding is initially distributed based on 
the proportion of the national foster care population residing in 
each state, and states must provide a 20 percent match.140 If a 
state fails to spend its federal allotment, other states may 
request access to those funds.141  
The law recognizes the unique situation of youth aged 
18 to 21, who have emancipated from foster care but are not 
yet fully self-sufficient. The Chafee Act calls for states to use 
some portion of their funds to provide a range of services and 
support for these aftercare youth.142 Each state is required to 
implement Independent Living Programs to “ensure that all 
 
137 § 677(b)(2)(D) (states should involve the public and private sectors); 
see also § 677(f)(1); Press Release, Child Welfare League of America, 
Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 (Nov. 23, 1999), available at 
http:www.cwla.org/advocacy/indlivhr3443.htm (last visited June 25, 
2004). 
138 § 677(f)(1)(A). The Chafee Act specifies these measures should include 
educational attainment, high school diploma, employment, avoidance of 
dependency, homelessness, nonmarital childbirth, incarceration, and high 
risk behaviors. Id.   
139 Press Release, supra note 137. 
140 Independent Living Fiscal Allocations, Administration of Children and 
Families Policy Manual 3.3B, available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws/cwpm/policy_dsp_pf.jsp?id=3 
(last visited Sept. 16, 2004).  
141 Id. 
142 § 677(a)(5) (Supp. 2002). 
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political subdivisions in the State are served by the program, 
though not necessarily in a uniform manner.”143 States may 
use 30 percent of their ILP funds to provide room and board to 
emancipated youth until age 21, and states may also choose to 
extend Medicaid to this population.144 These services also 
include participation in ILP programs, educational 
scholarships, and transitional housing opportunities.145 In 
addition, with the passage of the Promoting Safe and Stable 
Families Legislation of 2001, former foster youth may receive 
educational and training vouchers up to $5,000 per year for 
post-secondary education and vocational training.146  
 
B.  The Practical Problem: Delivery of Services 
The Chafee Act represents a promising legislative start 
to remedying the situation of emancipated youth. However, 
unless states effectively implement the Chafee Act, the due 
process rights of foster youth to proper preparation training 
may be violated. Indeed, several issues with the legislation 
have arisen since its 1999 enactment.   
First, although states must provide comprehensive 
reports to the federal government outlining their Chafee plan 
and its implementation,147 advocates are concerned that self-
reporting states are not always truthful about the level of 
 
143 § 677(b)(2)(B); see also Sylvia Junn & Jennifer Rodriguez, Out on 
Their Own: California’s Foster Youth & the Inequalities of the Indep. 
Living Program, 6 UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 189, 193 (2002). 
144 § 677(b)(3)(B). California chose to exercise this option and provides its 
state Medicaid program, titled “Medi-Cal,” to emancipated foster youth 
until age 21. Technically, the transfer should happen automatically when 
the youth emancipates. However, several youth have come to Youth 
Outreach Project clinics specifically because their Medi-Cal has been cut 
off. In most cases, the client’s Medi-Cal was either not transferred properly 
or was discontinued due to clerical errors.   
145 §§ 677(a)(1)-(6). 
146 § 677(i); see also National Resource Center for Youth Development, 
State by State Fact Pages: California, available at 
http://www.nrcys.ou.edu/NRCYD/etv.htm (last visited May 2, 2004). 
147 § 677(2). 
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services detailed in such reports.148 For example, caseworkers 
who are required to secure housing before a youth 
emancipates should ensure the youth are actually housed 
before they leave. Simply providing youth with a list of 
homeless shelters, as is the practice in some California 
counties, is hardly sufficient.149 In fact, providing a list of 
shelters to a foster youth could rise to the level of a due 
process violation; a youth would presumably be required to be 
homeless, and thus not properly prepared for emancipation, to 
access such shelters. 
Second, state flexibility under the Chafee Act enables 
each state to distribute Chafee funds to counties or political 
subdivisions at its discretion. In California, for example, the 
California Department of Social Services distributes Chafee 
funds to each county to operate their own ILP.150 Although 
each of the 58 counties in California offers some sort of 
Independent Living services to foster youth,151 less than 50 
percent of eligible foster youth actually receive ILP 
funding.152 Counties may choose to contract such services to a 
separate service provider, such as a nonprofit.153 As a result, 
the efficacy of ILPs and their success rate with youth varies 
from state to state, and even county to county.   
This delegation of services presents numerous issues. 
Lack of uniformity between counties results in disparate 
 
148 Interview with Tammy Wilsker, supra note 9.   
149 Interview with anonymous ILP service provider, San Diego, Cal. (May 
12, 2004). 
150 California Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Indep. Living Program, All-County 
Information Notice No. I-40-98, at 1 (July 22, 1998), in CALIFORNIA STATE 
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR FOSTER CARE, FOSTER CARE 
INFORMATION RESOURCES 10 (Oct. 2001), available at 
http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/getinfo/acin98/I-40-98.PDF (last visited June 
25, 2004).   
151 Junn & Rodriguez, supra note 143, at 195, citing LITTLE HOOVER 
COMMISSION, NOW IN OUR HANDS: CARING FOR CALIFORNIA’S ABUSED 
AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN (Report No. 152) iii (1999), available at 
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/report152.html (last visited May 8, 2004). 
152 Id. 
153 Id.; see also Junn & Rodriguez, supra note 143, at 194. For example, in 
San Diego County, ILP services are contracted out to three different 
nonprofits, each serving a specific region of the county. 
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treatment of foster and emancipated youth depending on their 
county of residence. Service and benefit discrepancies 
between counties and states can be detrimental to youth, 
particularly when they move to less generous counties after 
emancipation. For example, although some Florida counties 
provide high school graduation expenses to former foster 
youth, other counties do not.154 In Los Angeles County in 
2002, foster youth received “the most generous ILP benefits in 
the State,” including free laptop computers upon completion 
of an ILP program and scholarships for college.155 However, 
participants in neighboring Riverside County received only a 
small monetary bonus upon graduation from high school.156 
Essentially, a youth’s county or state of residence determines 
the amount of resources offered to them, and thus their 
potential for success.   
However, the Chafee bill was specifically designed to 
provide such flexibility to states; to some extent, discrepancy 
in services is a natural byproduct of flexibility and is to be 
expected. Also, freedom to experiment encourages states and 
counties to offer creative services to youth. Service providers 
can thus determine the most effective way to prepare youth for 
emancipation, and can share such knowledge with other 
regions. In this way, the flexibility of the Chafee Act promotes 
communication between service providers of various regions. 
However, as detailed below, additional legislative steps are 
required to ensure that the Chafee Act sufficiently prepares 
youth for the “real world.” 
 
IV.  Recommendations 
The precarious situation of foster youth preparing for 
emancipation clearly requires legal action. Litigation is 
certainly a viable option, particularly a lawsuit filed on behalf 
 
154 Email from Tammy Wilsker, Equal Justice Works Fellow, University of 
Miami Children & Youth Law Clinic (Aug. 31, 2004, 16:56 PST) (on file 
with author). 
155 Junn & Rodriguez, supra note 143, at 196. 
156 Id. 
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of youth in foster care who recognize they will not be 
adequately prepared for emancipation based on services 
provided. Youth could argue inadequate services violates their 
substantive due process right to be free from harm, and could 
point to the outcomes of former foster youth who were in 
similar situations to their own as evidence of the failure of 
such services. 
However, the government has already recognized its 
duty to provide services, and the Congress made an attempt to 
fulfill that duty through the Chafee Act. Concrete legislative 
changes would therefore be the most effective and speedy way 
to institute true improvements in emancipation services, and 
protect youth from harm.157 Six specific steps would be 
especially beneficial, and would assist the government in 
fulfilling its due process obligations to foster youth. 
 
A.  Mandatory Independent Living Program Services 
Independent living services are currently voluntary for 
youth in foster care or “aftercare” youth, those who have left 
the system but are not yet 21 years old.158 As a result, though, 
some youth derive great benefits from ILP services, youth can 
choose to have no preparation services before they 
emancipate. Given the high rates of poverty and incarceration 
for emancipated youth, foster care youth should not be 
allowed to opt out of preparation for adulthood. 
Requiring a base level of mandatory services for 
dependent youth would ensure each youth is properly screened 
 
157 Legislative improvements can also benefit other custodial populations, 
including former prisoners as they are released into mainstream society. 
For example, the U.S. House of Representatives is currently considering a 
bill designed to address the needs of ex-offenders as they reenter 
communities after incarceration. See Press Release, Legal Action Center 1 
(June 23, 2004), available at 
www.hirenetwork.org/pdfs/pr_reen1_finaljune04.pdf. The bill, titled the 
“Second Chance Act,” would provide grants to States and local areas to 
provide drug and mental health treatment, education and job training, and 
housing assistance to these individuals as they leave state custody.  
158 Interview with anonymous ILP service provider, supra note 8.  
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and provided services before moving into the “real world.” 
Additionally, mandating ILP services at an early age, such as 
12 or 13, would encourage youth to begin thinking about post-
emancipation plans before they reach the current ILP age of 
16.159  
Admittedly, mandatory ILP services may produce a 
backlash, particularly among young people who do not wish to 
have any more contact than necessary with “the system.” 
However, the likelihood of screening youth in trouble and 
providing services to them before they leave the system, 
outweighs any potential backlash.   
Although some consequence may be necessary for 
failure to cooperate with ILP, punishing youth who do not 
attend ILP services would be contrary to the spirit of the 
Chafee legislation. This problem may be avoided by 
mandating a very minimum level of mandatory services, 
which need not rise to the level of weekly classes. Required 
services could consist only of quarterly meetings with 
caseworkers.   
Naturally, adding mandatory preparation services for 
every youth in foster care will substantially increase foster 
care costs. However, as demonstrated by the statistics above, 
the costs incurred by society’s failure to prepare youth greatly 
outweigh the costs of additional programs. For example, the 
financial expenditures required to incarcerate one individual, 
or to provide extended shelter for a homeless individual, are 
much more costly than case management or ILP classes.160 To 
 
159 Id. Though some counties offer ILP services to foster youth as young as 
14, San Diego County begins ILP services at age 16. Interview with 
anonymous ILP service provider, supra note 8.  
160 The typical cost of an ILP class in San Diego County is slightly more 
than $200, depending on how many youth attend. Teachers’ salaries and 
administrative costs add up to approximately $50-$60 per class. Each 
youth in attendance receives a $10 stipend; classes usually have 
approximately 15 youth attending, for a total of $150 in stipends. Email 
from anonymous ILP service provider, San Diego, Cal., to author (Aug. 
24, 2004, 3:18 PST) (on file with author). In comparison, the cost of one 
year of incarceration in California is $23,406. San Francisco AIDS 
Foundation, supra note 53.   
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avoid these greater social costs, Congress should act to require 
a specific minimum level of ILP services for every foster 
youth preparing for emancipation. 
 
B.  More Efficient Independent Living Services 
Even youth receiving only a minimum level of ILP 
services should be prepared for adulthood. However, many 
youth involved with ILP emancipate without sufficient skills 
for the “real world,” in part due to inefficient or irrelevant 
training. For example, ILP classes on budgeting and résumé 
writing may not be effective for a youth teetering on the brink 
of homelessness. State legislatures and Congress should focus 
their resources on ensuring ILP funds are spent in the most 
beneficial way possible for foster youth.   
Some jurisdictions, including Miami, Fla., offer 
virtually no independent living services to youth aged 13 to 
18.161 This fact is troubling, especially given the Chafee Act’s 
(and Florida state law’s) directive to prepare foster youth for 
adulthood.162 Five years after enacting the Chafee Act, 
lawmakers should require more outcome data and information 
about the success or failure of individual state programs. Such 
analysis would enable service providers to design more 
efficient Independent Living services. 
Former foster youth themselves recognize the 
limitations of relying on classes as the primary way to teach 
basic life skills. Though emancipated foster youth in San 
Diego County appreciate the commitment of caseworkers and 
ILP teachers, many youth believe “the classes need to be 
different.”163 Members of the National Association of Former 
 
161 Email from Tammy Wilsker, Equal Justice Works Fellow, University of 
Miami Children & Youth Law Clinic, (Aug. 31, 2004, 16:56 PST) (on file 
with author). 
162 FLA. STAT. ch. § 409.1451 (1)(a) (2004) states the Department of 
Children and Family services “shall administer a system of independent 
living services.” 
163Interview with members of the National Association of Former Foster 
Care Youth, supra note 22.   
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Foster Care Youth in San Diego,164 recommend the program 
“needs to be more hands-on information … kids need to do 
more realistic things, like cooking and laundry.”165 The youth 
were also concerned that incentives to attend class, such as the 
$10 class attendance payment in San Diego, results in non-
motivated youth attending classes simply for financial 
reward.166  
From the caseworker perspective, even unmotivated 
youth can learn something once they are actually in the 
classroom. Caseworkers also recognize the value of a support 
system for foster youth and emancipated youth beyond 
schools and foster homes; for many youth, ILP classes provide 
the only mechanism for supervised peer support.167 However, 
emancipated youth themselves commented on the fact that 
“some kids go [to ILP classes just] to hit on girls.”168 The 
youth were also concerned about the difficulty of teaching 
real-life skills in a classroom setting because:  
[F]oster youth should be prepared, but not just 
in the classroom… foster parents have 
responsibilities [to prepare youth], and group 
homes have responsibilities.169  
The youth interviewed agreed that such money could be better 
spent on housing or employment programs for former foster 
youth.170 Such programs could be tailored to meet the needs of 
individual children, creating more effective wraparound 
services.   
 
164 The National Association of Former Foster Care Youth is an 
organization of youth in San Diego aged 18-26, all of whom emancipated 
from foster care at the age of 18. The group offers peer mentoring to youth 
struggling with the transition from foster care to adulthood, and works to 
raise awareness of the issues facing emancipated youth.    
165 Interview with members of the National Association of Former Foster 
Care Youth, supra note 22.     




170 Interview with members of the National Association of Former Foster 
Care Youth, supra note 22. 
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Although some additional costs might be incurred 
initially to streamline services, making programs more 
efficient would not necessarily require more funding. For 
example, changing the focus of ILP classes could be 
accomplished easily by ILP teachers, particularly with input 
from youth themselves. Alternatively, eliminating classes 
completely in favor of more individualized housing or 
employment programs would simply require a redirection of 
funds. Because Congress already deemed ILP services a 
priority in the Chafee Act,171 increasing the efficiency of these 
services would further congressional intent. 
 
C.  Mandatory Legal Skills Training 
In addition to life skills training, foster youth should be 
educated about basic legal skills required to properly function 
in society. These skills include how to negotiate a contract 
(including automobile, cell phone, and employment contracts), 
the essentials of landlord/tenant law (including signing a 
lease), and how to ensure a good credit rating. Failure to teach 
these skills to foster youth has significant repercussions, as 
seen by attorneys working directly with this population.172  
For example, a youth’s failure to fully comprehend a 
cell phone contract before signing it can result in 
overpayments and improper charges. In one case handled by 
YOP, a youth agreed to a cell phone store’s $500 cancellation 
charge, in addition to the cell phone company’s regular 
cancellation charge of $175.173 When the youth lost her job 
and was unable to afford the cell phone bill and cancelled the 
phone, she could not pay the resulting $675 charge. The bill 
eventually went to collections and had a negative impact on 
her credit report.174 As the youth herself reported, proper 
understanding of basic contract principles would have 
 
171 42 U.S.C. § 677(a)(5) (Supp. 2004). 
172 See, e.g., Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 
2004). 
173 Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 2004). 
174 Id. 
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prevented her from signing this contract.175 Ultimately, 
attorneys in YOP advocated on her behalf and her credit report 
was cleared.176  
Legal skills are especially important for youth entering 
the workplace. Knowing that foster youth lack the 
sophistication of experienced workers, employers may take 
advantage of former foster youth employees. When YOP 
began in 2002, attorneys were shocked at the number of 
clients with meritorious wage claim cases and unemployment 
claim cases.177 YOP brought several wage claims and 
unemployment compensation claims from 2002 to 2004.178 In 
each of these cases, an attorney’s advocacy successfully 
secured monetary judgments on behalf of former foster youth 
clients. 179 The pattern of employers taking advantage of 
young employees with no family or social support became 
apparent. With legal knowledge, youth would be better able to 
protect themselves against illegal actions of employers. 
Some might argue legal skills are not required for basic 
levels of success in the “real world”; after all, many 
functioning adults do not have access to lawyers or legal 
services. However, these skills are particularly important for 
foster youth. As a vulnerable population, one relatively small 
legal issue can quickly become a significant barrier to success. 
For example, “Joe” came to a YOP clinic with a simple 
identity theft problem.180 When he was 14 years old, Joe’s 
grandfather used his social security number to obtain a 
fraudulent credit card. With this credit card, Joe’s grandfather 
purchased a car in Joe’s name. Joe did not have any 
knowledge of the car until he turned 18 and applied for 
financial aid to attend college. With a $14,000 bill outstanding 
on his credit, Joe was denied financial aid. Without any legal 
knowledge, Joe felt college was now an impossibility, and he 






179 Youth Outreach Project case files, San Diego, Cal. (Aug. 2004). 
180 Id. 
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With the help of YOP attorneys, Joe learned how to clear his 
credit and subsequently applied successfully for financial 
aid.181 He is now attending college. 
With the help of the private bar and legal service 
organizations, mandatory legal skills could be taught to foster 
youth at no additional financial cost. In YOP’s experience, 
many private attorneys are eager to share their knowledge with 
foster youth, through workshops, seminars, and individual 
mentoring. Connecting foster youth to volunteer attorneys is 
logistically simple, and can result in significant benefits for 
emancipating youth. 
 
D.  Expanded Housing Services  
Theoretically, foster youth should not be emancipated 
from foster care unless they have a known stable living 
arrangement. The Chafee Act currently allows up to 30 
percent of all ILP funds to be used to support housing for 
former foster youth. 182 However, given the prevalence of 
homelessness among this population, a higher minimum 
standard of housing support must be instituted by the federal 
government. 
To adequately support housing, Congress will likely 
need to raise the current 30 percent cap on housing funds in 
the Chafee Act. One potential objection to this action would 
be the importance of other areas of training for foster youth, 
such as employment skills or education training. However, 
housing must be a priority; without stable housing, most youth 
are unable to achieve stability in other areas, including work 
and school. Additionally, as mentioned above, society will 
ultimately pay financial costs in the form of shelters or 
incarceration for youth who emancipate into homelessness.   
The government should therefore ensure each foster 
youth has some sort of housing for the first 12 months after 
emancipation. This initial housing should span the spectrum of 
 
181 Id. 
182 42 U.S.C. § 677(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2002).   
Summer 2005 An Ounce of Prevention 421 
  
                                                
housing needs for this population, including emergency 
shelters specifically for former foster youth (to prevent their 
association with the adult homeless population), and 
transitional living places for more independent youth.   
In New York City, a model program called “The 
Chelsea Foyer” provides a supportive housing-based job 
training program for 40 young adults.183 The 18 to 24 month 
individualized program includes a congregate living setting, 
onsite case management, and connections to job training and 
placement, education, and life-skills development resources.184 
This type of wraparound service model, offering personalized 
assistance to help youth achieve the “independent living and 
employment skills necessary to obtain affordable housing,” 
could be successful throughout the country.185 Though the 
financial cost of providing such services to a large population 
of former foster youth would likely be substantial, the 
potential for youth to be successful in all areas of life would 
ultimately reduce social costs. 
Housing support could also take the form of housing 
vouchers for former foster youth. For example, a pilot 
program providing county-funded housing vouchers to former 
foster youth has been very successful in San Diego County.186  
Emancipated foster youth who are employed may be 
eligible for the “HOME” program, which requires a youth to 
pay for rent with 30 percent of his/her income with San Diego 
County paying the remainder.187 Admittedly, the program has 
shortcomings. Though the program has a high success rate, it 
only serves high-functioning youth who are nearly 
 
183 Good Shepard Services, Residential Services, available at 
http://www.goodshepherds.org/sub-programs_services/ 
ps-residential_services.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2004). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. A similar supportive housing program is also being offered through 
the First Place Fund for Youth, a nonprofit in Oakland, Cal. See First Place 
Fund for Youth, Supportive Housing Program, available at 
http://www.firstplacefund.org/programs/shp-main.html (last visited Sept. 
16, 2004). 
186 Interview with anonymous ILP service provider, supra note 8. 
187 Id. 
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independent already.188 Additionally, the program’s long 
waiting list has made it impracticable for many youth leaving 
foster care. 189 However, even with these issues, the HOME 
program represents a creative response to the housing crisis of 
former foster youth. 
 
E.  Employment Subsidies 
In addition to safe housing, stable employment is a 
major obstacle for many former foster youth, who do not have 
the interview skills or job experience to be competitive in 
today’s job market. Providing partial monetary subsidies to 
employers hiring former foster youth in entry-level positions 
would promote the employability of this population. In many 
cases, once a youth has secured his/her first entry-level job, 
stable employment becomes a less intimidating goal.190
Employment subsidies are especially plausible due to 
Congress’ recent focus on educational and vocational 
scholarships. In 2001, Congress added a sixth purpose to the 
Chafee Bill providing for educational vouchers for former 
foster youth.191 Congress clearly recognizes the need for foster 
youth to obtain needed skills to become competitive job-
seekers. Employment subsidies are a natural next step, 
enabling emancipated youth who obtained job skills to utilize 
these skills in a “real world” work environment.192
The subsidies may take a variety of forms, including 
provision of a monetary bonus or tax credit for employers 
hiring former foster youth. Some might contend subsidies 
“brand” youth in the working world, implying that employees 




190 Interview with anonymous former foster youth, San Diego, Cal. (Sept. 
16, 2004). 
191 42 U.S.C. § 677(i) (Supp. 2002). 
192 Similar subsidies already exist for welfare recipients, in the form of 
subsidy grants and tax credits for employers who hire welfare recipients. 
See id. § 601(a); 26 U.S.C. § 51(a) (2000).   
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discrimination in the workplace. However, the possibility of 
discrimination is not enough to outweigh the benefits of real 
work experience. Additionally, with training in basic legal 
skills, youth would be able to properly report such 
discrimination. Opponents might further argue that youth will 
become dependent on subsidies and will not learn how to find 
work in the “real world” without assistance. To prevent this 
situation, subsidies may be offered to youth on a one-time 
basis, simply to enable youth to “get their foot in the door” of 
the working world. In addition to providing youth with much-
needed work experience, federal or state employment 
subsidies for this population would send a message to the 
general public: We must all work together to integrate former 
foster youth into mainstream society. 
 
F.  State Statutory Reforms 
In addition to federal legislative reforms, states also 
play an important role in improving the lives of former foster 
youth. State statutes governing the emancipation of foster 
youth provide an opportunity for expanded emancipation 
services. For example, Florida Statute section 409.1451, 
passed in 2004, is designed to implement Chafee Act funds 
more effectively.193 The law specifically provides for aftercare 
support services for young adults formerly in foster care, 
including but not limited to (a) mentoring/tutoring, (b) mental 
health services and substance abuse counseling, (c) life skills 
classes (including credit management and preventive health 
services), (d) parenting classes, (e) job skills training, (f) 
counselor consultations, and (g) temporary financial 
assistance.194 The law also enables foster youth as young as 13 
to be eligible for similar services, called “preindependent 
living services.”195 Additionally, the Florida legislature gave 
power to the judiciary to ensure compliance with the statute. If 
the court determines a county department has not complied 
 
193 FLA. STAT. ch. § 409.1451 (2004).  
194 §§ 409.1451(5) (a)1a-g. 
195 §§ 409.1451(4)(a)1-2.   
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with its obligations to provide ILS services to an individual 
child, the court “shall give the department 30 days within 
which to comply and, on failure to comply … the department 
may be held in contempt.”196 Thus, counties will be held 
accountable to the court for failure to provide services to 
foster youth and former foster youth. The law has been 
criticized for taking money away from youth because counties 
required to pay penalties will have less funds for direct foster 
youth services.197 Even with this criticism, the law reflects the 
favorable intent of Florida’s legislature to strengthen the 
delivery of ILP services.  
In New York, state law defines a foster child as a 
person (i) under the age of 18; or (ii) between the ages of 18 
and 21 but consented to remain in foster care past his/her 19th 
birthday, and (a) is a student at a school, college, or university; 
(b) is attending a vocational or technical training course; (c) 
lacks the skills or ability to live independently.198 With this 
definition, foster youth may remain in the system until they 
are actually prepared for independent living. This type of 
statute should be adopted in other jurisdictions to ensure youth 
emancipating from foster care are actually able to live self-
sufficiently. 
In California, Welfare & Institutions Code section 391 
states the court may retain jurisdiction over a foster child 
unless the government has provided the child with specific 
documentation, assistance in securing housing and 
employment, assistance in applying for college or a vocational 
training program, and assistance in maintaining important 
relationships with the child.199 However, in some counties, 
simply providing brochures to a foster child regarding 
employment, housing or education constitutes “assistance.”200 
 
196 § 39.701(8)(c). 
197 Telephone interview with anonymous child welfare advocate (Sept. 9, 
2004). 
198 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 427.2 (1) (2004) (emphasis 
added). 
199 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 391(b)-(c) (West Supp. 2005). 
200 Email from Robert Fellmeth, Director, Children’s Advocacy Institute, 
to author (July 19, 2004, 17:45 PST) (on file with author). 
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Clearly, this minimal action does not ensure the emancipated 
youth is successful in those areas. 
Advocates are therefore working to specify a standard 
for assistance before a youth leaves juvenile court jurisdiction. 
Prof. Robert Fellmeth at the Children’s Advocacy Institute in 
San Diego is working to define exactly what the court must do 
to fulfill this statutory section before emancipating a foster 
youth.201 He argues the statutory intent requires youth be 
provided with education, health, housing, and employment 
arrangements to allow independent living.202 Few counties are 
currently complying with this interpretation.203 The fact state 
legislatures are increasingly recognizing the need for more 
effective Independent Living Services is promising, but states 
must now take further steps to ensure the proper 
implementation of such statutes. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
As shown in the case of Theresa, youth preparing to 
emancipate from foster care face extensive challenges in the 
transition to adulthood. Because foster youth are in state 
custody, they possess a Fourteenth Amendment substantive 
due process right to government protection from harm. 
However, to adequately protect children, this right must 
include proper emancipation services and training for 
adulthood. Sadly, it is not only foster youth who are harmed 
by our failure to prepare them properly for emancipation. 
Society also pays a price for the poverty of former foster youth 
through incarceration costs, homelessness and shelter costs, 
and crime. Children in foster care still have a chance, but it is 
the government’s responsibility to ensure their preparation for 
the “real world.” 
 
201 The Children’s Advocacy Institute is an academic center and statewide 
advocacy group based at the University of San Diego. More information is 
available at www.caichildlaw.org. 
202 Email from Robert Fellmeth, supra note 200. 
203 Id .  
